Democratic deficit in the European Union
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The democratic deficit in the European Union is the notion that there are alledged democratic problems that have been a result of the process of creating the European Union (EU). The phrase "democratic deficit" has been attributed to Bill Newton Dunn, a British Member of the European Parliament who used the term in a pamphlet in the 1980s.[citation needed]
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[edit] Notions
[edit] European Executives
A notable response to the criticism that European integration has raised the powers of Executives in comparison to Parliaments has come from Andrew Moravcsik, who claims that the European Union has made Executives more accountable to their citizens. He notes that the actions of government ministers are no longer scrutinised simply at home, but in a wider European context and that ministers at home are no longer held to account solely for their domestic record, but also for their actions in Brussels- as for instance is demonstrated by some of the criticism Tony Blair received after concessions made over the UK rebate in 2005.
A more general point not related to Moravcsik's argument is that already mentioned, namely that the European Parliament has received a notable increase in powers since the Maastricht Treaty, with mechanisms such as co-decision procedures (between the Council of Ministers and European Parliament) being introduced and adopted in many policy areas. The European Parliament has also acquired something of a de facto scrutinising role where the conduct of Commissioners is concerned as evidenced by the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 under EP pressure in addition to explicit powers to veto Commission lineups - a power used in 2004 against the Barroso Commission. Nevertheless the debate over whether the European Union has increased the power of Executives vis a vis Parliaments remains highly contentious and should be considered in the context of increasing globalisation and security fears following 11 September.
The claim of executive dominance at European level is exaggerated, since this merely reproduces the informal situation at national level. theres a local form of executive dominance, on average less then 15% of legislative initiatives from MPs become law when they don't have the backing of the executive, further more proposal from the executives become law, usually unamended.[1]
According to R. Daniel Kelemen, EU laws are more detailed when compared with member states laws, similarly with federal states, the legal system is used to unsure political results from the member states, because of the decentralized nature of the political system. Decisions are taken by the EU level but, implementation is overwhelmingly done by member states. In contrast, inside member states, usually, decision making and implementation is done by the same actors. So net effect, is that EU law encroaches on the executive powers of national governments.[2]
Voting in the council is usually done with QMV, and sometimes with unanimity. This means that for the vast majority of EU legislation the corresponding national government has usually voted in favor in the Council. To give an example, up to September 2006, of the 86 pieces of legislation adopted in that year the government of the United Kingdom had voted in favor of the legislation 84 times, abstained from voting twice and never voted against. [3]
[edit] European parliament
The supposition that EP is powerless is due to its recent past as a consultative assembly and the implicit comparison with national parliaments, but this comparison leads to false conclusions. Important differences with national parliaments are the role of committees, bipartisan voting, decentralized political parties, executive-legislative divide and absence of Government-opposition divide. All these traits are considered as signs of weakness or unaccountability, but these very same traits are found in the US House of Representatives, EP is more appropriately compared with the US house of representatives.[1]
Legislative initiative in the EU rests only on the commission,while in member states it is shared between parliament and executive, but less then 15% of legislative initiatives from MPs become law when they don't have the backing of the executive. EP can only propose amendments, but unlike in national parliaments, the executive has no guaranteed majority to secure the passage of its legislation. In national parliaments, amendments are usually proposed by the opposition, who lack a majority for their approval and usually fail. But given the European Parliament's independence, and the need to get majority approval from it, proposals made by its many parties (none of which hold a majority alone) have an unusually high 80% success rate in the adoption of its amendments. Even in controversial proposals, its success rate is 30%, something not mirrored by national legislatures.[1]
Liberal MEP Chris Davies, says he has far more influence as a member of the European parliament than he did as an opposition MP in the House of Commons. "Here I started to have an impact on day one", "And there has not been a month since when words I tabled did not end up in legislation." [4]
[edit] European elections
| “ | Turnout across Europe (1999) was higher than in the last US presidential election, and I don't hear people questioning the legitimacy of the presidency of the United States--Pat Cox[4] | ” |
According to some observers[5], the EU doesn't have a formal democratic deficit, but an informal one due to a social deficit. People believe that there's a democratic deficit so they don't go to vote, and thus create the democratic deficit by thinking there is one, a self generating situation, for which formal reform can do little to help. [5] Turn out is low, especially bad is the performance of the UK, 11 million votes were cast in 1999, while 23 million were cast in Big Brother in 2002. [4]
[edit] Transparency and Judicial Review
Contrary to the claims mentioned above many scholars[who?] have argued that the decision making process in the EU is actually more transparent than the corresponding processes in member states. Notable reforms (partly motivated by a desire to respond to the initial criticisms) have made it comparatively easy for interest groups and citizens to access EU documents concerned with policy making including memos from debates in the Council of Ministers. Furthermore the actions of European actors come under scrutiny from not only the ECJ but also from national courts and this extensive judicial review, it has been argued, is sufficient so as to ensure the accountability of policy makers in the EU.
[edit] Process Promotes Consensus
In response to arguments concerning policy bias some scholars have been keen to point out that the decision making process in the European Union relies heavily on consensus between actors. Qualified majority voting and unanimity are still used in Council votes and as such it has been argued that policies will inevitably reflect very centrist positions because any policy which leans too far to one side of the political spectrum will only require a small minority to oppose it for it to be rejected. Empirical evidence for either side of this debate has perhaps unsurprisingly been hard to come by due to the subjective nature of 'policy bias' arguments.
[edit] Proposed reform
The Treaty of Lisbon, which is currently in the process of ratification, would modify the following elements which have been mentioned in relation to the alledged democratic deficit:
- The codecision would be established as the standard legislative procedure, hence increasing the Parliament's ability to shape and propose legislation.
- It would require the Council (meetings between national governments) to meet in public at all formal meetings.
- It would ensure that national parliaments receive draft legislation earlier from the Commission.
- It would give national parliaments a new power to send any proposal back to the Commission for reconsideration.
- It would confirm the principle of subsidiarity as fundamental to the Union.
- It would create a new citizens' right of initiative, obliging the Commission to consider any proposal for legislation that has the support of 1 million EU citizens.
[edit] References
- ^ a b c Kreppel, Amie (2006). "Understanding the European Parliament from a Federalist Perspective: The Legislatures of the USA and EU Compared". Center for European Studies, University of Florida. http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/kreppel/COMFEDFINAL.pdf. Retrieved on 2008-09-26.
- ^ The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond (Dr. R. Daniel Kelemen)
- ^ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1279&lang=EN
- ^ a b c http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3224666.stm
- ^ a b http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2005/demodef/avbelj
[edit] Further reading
- Follesdal, A and Hix, S. (2005) ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU‘ European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. C-05-02
- Majone, G. (2005) 'Dilemmas of European Integration'.
- Marsh, M. (1998) ‘Testing the second-order election model after four European elections’ British Journal of Political Science Research. Vol 32.
- Moravcsik, A. (2002) ‘In defence of the democratic deficit: reassessing legitimacy in the European Union’ Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol 40, Issue 4.
- Reif, K and Schmitt, S. (1980) ‘Nine second-order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results’ European Journal of Political Research. Vol 8, Issue 1.
- Dr. R. Daniel Kelemen (2004) ‘The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond‘ Harvard University Press
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